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CASE NOTES
Contracts—Employment At Will: Contractual Remedy For Dis-
charge Motivated By Bad Faith, Malice, Or Retaliation—Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co. '— Plaintiff, Olga Monge, a general factory work-
er, was hired by defendant Beebe Rubber Company in September,
1968, under an oral contract of employment at will. The contract
included neither a specific term of employment nor any restrictions
on the power of the employer to terminate the contract. Plaintiff
worked for defendant under this contract for approximately one
year. At that time, defendant terminated the contract, on the as-
serted justification that plaintiff had been absent from work for
three consecutive days without calling in. 2 Monge brought an action
against Beebe Rubber Company for breach of the oral contract of
employment,; alleging that during her employment she was con-
tinuously harassed by defendant's foreman, a man known by com-
pany management to use his position to force his attentions on
female employees under his authority, because she had refused to
accept a date with him. She alleged that this hostility, which was
condoned if not shared by defendant's personnel manager, was the
real reason for her discharge. 4
Trial by jury resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of
$2,500. 5 Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire. HELD: termination by the employer of a contract of employ-
ment at will, if motivated by bad faith or malice, or based on
retaliation, constitutes a breach of the employment contract entitling
the employee to lost wages: 6
 The court based its holding on public
policy considerations drawing an analogy between its own decision
and recent judicial modification of the tenancy at will relationship in
property law. 7 Bad faith termination by the employer of the contract
— N.H. —, 316 A.2d 549 (1974),
2 316 A.2d at 551.
Id. at 550. Although plaintiff was a union member at the time of her discharge, she did
not seek a union hearing to appeal the discharge. Generally, an employee who fails to exhaust
the grievance procedures established under a collective bargaining agreement will not be
allowed to resort to the civil courts in an action for wrongful discharge. However, this
requirement applies only when the employee sues on a right which is incorporated in the
collective bargaining agreement. Jorgensen v. Penn, R,R., 25 N.J, 541, 556-60, 138 A.2d 24,
32-35 (1958); Payne v. Pullman Co., 13 III. App. 2d 105, 111-12, 141 N.E.2d 83, 86 (1957);
See also Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1960). Since Monge sued on a right which was not
incorporated in the collective bargaining agreement, her failure to initially exhaust the
grievance procedures of the union did not bar her resort to the civil courts. But see 316 A.2d
at 553 (dissenting opinion).
316 A.2d at 550.
5 Id. at 550.
6 Id. at 551.
7
 Id. at 551. The court specifically referred to Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d
248 (1971), in which the court allowed a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases, 111 N.H. at 92, 276 A.2d at 251-52; and to Sargeant v. Ross,
— N.H. —, 308 A.2d 528 (1973), in which the court imposed tort liability on a landlord for
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of employment at will was not, the court concluded, in the best
interests of the economic system or of the public good. 8
This New Hampshire decision represents the first judicial or
legislative attempt to impose a general limitation on the employer's
power, unrestricted at common law, to terminate a contract of
employment at will. Although both courts and legislatures have
previously enumerated specific reasons for which the employer may
not terminate the at will relationship, no such general limitation has
ever been previously imposed. 9 This note will: examine the history
of the employment at will relationship; analyze the court's holding;
and finally, consider whether the decision represents a sound ad-
vancement of the law governing employment relationships.
During the nineteenth century, the employer's workshop was
his castle. Contracts of employment for an indefinite term, and for
permanent or lifetime employment, were presumed to be contracts
for employment at will," and as such could be terminated by the
employer at any time and for any reason." The employee was
entitled neither to notice before termination" nor to an explanation
of the reasons for the termination.°
the death of a child caused by the landlord's negligent design or construction of an outdoor
stairway, although the stairway was not considered a "common stairway." 308 A.2d at 535.
316 A.2d at 551,
Blumrosen, Employee Discipline: United States Report, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 428, 429
(1964).
For cases dealing with employment for an indefinite term, see Speeder Cycle Co. v.
Teeters, 18 Ind. App. 474, 478, 48 N.E. 595, 597 (1897); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter,
67 Md. 554, 557, 11 A. 176, 178 (1887); Booth v. National India Rubber Co., 19 R.I. 696,
697, 36 A. 714, 715 (1897). See also 9 S. Williston, Contracts § 1017, at 129 (3d ed. 1967);
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 442, at 339 (1958).
For cases dealing with permanent or lifetime employment, see Lord v. Goldbert, 81 Cal.
596, 602, 22 P. 1126, 1127-28 (1889); Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439,
444, 164 N.E, 342, 344 (1928). See also 9 S. Williston, supra at 131 (3d ed. 1967);
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 442, at 340 (1958); Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1432 (1925). This
presumption did not apply if the employee could show consideration in addition to the
promise to perform which would support the promise that employment would be for life or
permanent. See, e.g., Carnig v. Carr, 67 Mass. 544, 547, 46 N.E. 117, 118 (1897); Annot., 35
A.L.R. 1432 (1925).
The authorities were split on whether a contract of employment at a specific amount per
week, month, or year was presumed to be at will or for a specific term of one week, month, or
year. In favor of the presumption that such a contract is for employment at will, see Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Harvey, 99 Ky. 157, 160-61, 34 S.W. 1069, 1070 (1896); H. Wood, Master &
Servant § 134 (1877). In favor of the presumption that such contracts are for employment for
a specific term, see Tubbs v. Cummings Co., 200 Mass. 555, 558, 86 N.E. 921, 922 (1909);
Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921),
11 One court's formulation of the common law rule was: "All may dismiss their
employe[els at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Atlantic R.R., 82
Tenn. 401, 411 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v, Watteri, 132 Tenn, 527, 179
S.W. 134 (1915).
' 2 Allgood v. M. Feckoury, 36 Ga. App. 42, 43, 135 S.E. 314 (1926); O'Conner v. Hayes
Body Corp., 258 Mich. 280, 282, 242 N.W. 233, 234 (1932); 9 S. Williston, supra note 10, at
130.
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Many justifications have been advanced for this common law
rule: (1) freedom of contract and mutuality (if the employee can quit
for any reason, then the employer can discharge for any reason);"
(2) freedom of enterprise;" (3) expectations of the parties;" and (4)
fostering a climate more conducive to the industrial revolution."
However, in practice the rule often caused very harsh results."
Nevertheless, the early courts continued to apply it mechanically
whenever the employment contract did not contain a specific term of
employment. ' 9
In contrast, under the British rule, a general or indefinite hiring
was presumed to be for a one-year term during which the employee
could be discharged only for cause." If the employee continued to
work beyond the one-year term, the courts would presume employ-
ment for an additional one-year term; only at the end of a term
could the employee be discharged without cause. 21 Although this
rule received some early acceptance in America, 22 it had been com-
pletely rejected by the latter part of the 19th century. 23
The turn of the century brought the first legislative attempts to
regulate the employer's power to terminate the employment at will
13
 Brink's, Inc. v. Hoyt, 179 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1950); Carr v, Montgomery Ward &
Co., 363 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo. 1963).
14
 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1915).
" See Blumrosen, Workers Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis—A
Judge for Our Season, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 480, 481 (1970); Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 343 (1974).
14
 Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: United States Report, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 428
(1964); Note, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 397, 398 (1960).
" Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 Stan.
L. Rev. 1015 (1970).
" See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423, 423-24 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1908) (200 black stevedores discharged to provide jobs for white stevedores); Comerford v.
International Harvester Co., 235 Ala. 376, 377, 178 So. 894, 897 (1938) (employee discharged
because of employer's failure to alienate the affections of employee's wife).
19
 Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 603, 22 P. 1126, 1128 (1889); Speeder Cycle Co. v.
Teeters, 18 Ind, App. 474, 478, 48 N.E. 595, 597 (1897). At common law, the employee could
attempt to prove that the employment contract was for a specific term, even though no such
specific term was expressly stated in the contract. Evidence of prior negotiations, usages of the
business, nature of the employment, and other circumstances surrounding the transaction
could be introduced to show an implied term in the employment contract. E.g., Norton v.
Cowell, 65 Md. 359, 362, 4 A. 408, 410 (1886). The United States Supreme Court recently
affirmed this principle of implying a specific term from sources external to the employment
contract in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). There, the Court cited the "unwritten
common law of a particular university" as such an external source. Id. at 602. Perry has been
cited with approval as representing a flexible judicial approach to analyzing employment
cases. See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 350 (1974).
This note also discusses other possible external sources from which a specific term of employ-
ment may be implied. Id. at 356.
20
 Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026, 1027 (K.B. 1834); Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng.
Rep. 786, 787 (C.P. 1827).
21
 110 Eng. Rep. 1026, 1027 (K.B. 1834); 130 Eng. Rep. 786, 787 (C.P. 1827).
22 E.g., Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 128, 26 N.E. 143, 144-45 (1891); Davis v.
Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255, 257 (1857).
23
 Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 340 (1974).
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relationship. Federa1 24 and state25 statutes were enacted which pro-
hibited the employer from discharging an employee because of par-
ticipation in labor union activities. However, these statutes were
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Adair v. United
States 26 and Coppage v. Kansas. 27
In Adair, the Court held that such a federal statute was uncon-
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded that
the statute invaded both the right of the employer to discharge for
any reason and the personal liberty of the employer and the em-
ployee to freedom of contract." In Coppage, the Court condemned a
similar state statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Both deci-
sions reflect a rationale similar to the doctrine of mutuality: "[T]he
right of the employee to quit the service of the employer for what-
ever reason is the same as the right of the employer for whatever
reason to dispense with the services of such employee."3°
As a result, during the early part of the twentieth century, the
employee hired under a contract of employment at will was still in
an unenviable position. The Supreme Court had declared that any
job security for the employee may result only from bargaining
between the parties to the employment contract. 31 However, few
employees enjoyed sufficient bargaining power to secure such job
security. 32 Consequently, the employment at will relationship con-
tinued to be heavily weighted in favor of the employer. 33
This situation finally began to change in the 1930's. In NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 34 the United States Supreme Court
34 Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424.
25 Law of April 14, 1892, ch. 10, § 12943, [1926] Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 5598 (declared
unconstitutional, Jackson v. Berger, 92 Ohio St. 130, 110 N.E. 732 (1915)).
26 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
37 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
3$ 208 U.S. at 172.
39 236 U.S at 26.
3 ° 208 U.S. at 174-75. During the early part of the 20th century, similar statutes as those
involved in Adair and Coppage were also being declared unconstitutional at the state level.
See Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Title Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 305, 76 P. 848, 850 (1904);
People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257, 261, 77 N.E. 1073, 1075 (1906); St. Louis S.W. Ry, v.
Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 489, 171 S.W. 703, 707 (1914).
31 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10-11.
32 The only workers who had any degree of bargaining power were those who possessed
specialized skills in great demand, or those who were members of labor unions.
33 The Supreme Court was not unaware of the unequal bargaining power between the
employer and the employee. However, the Court accepted this fact simply as an inevitable
consequence of the freedom of contract and the private ownership of property:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists there must and will be
inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a
contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances ... [but] it is from the nature
of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that
are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17.
34 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the National Labor
Relations Act's which prohibited the discharge of any employee
because of membership in a labor union." This decision represented
the first significant judicial approval of a limitation of the employer's
power to terminate the employment at will relationship because of
some overriding interest of both employees and society. Further-
more, the decision helped to trigger a substantial increase in union
membership, which afforded some degree of job security to a larger
percentage of American workers. 37
Subsequent federal statutes began to add to the list of specific
reasons for which an employee could not be discharged: race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin," age;" debt," for invoking the
protection of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'" Other federal statutes
created categories of employees who could not be discharged with-
out good cause: veterans returning to prior employment within 90
days of discharge from the armed services," civil service employees
in the executive branch of the federal government (competitive
service)."
In some states, the courts also added to the list of specific
reasons for which the employer could not terminate the employment
at will relationship, by allowing a civil cause of action where the
employee is discharged: for refusal to commit perjury before a state
agency as ordered by the employer," for participation in labor
union activities," or for filing a claim under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. 46
Thus, by the 1970's many specific limitations had been imposed
on the common law right of the employer to terminate the employ-
ment at will relationship. However, there was as yet no general
requirement of good faith or good cause for discharge.. Against this
35 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
36 301 U.S. at 49.
37
 In 1935 only 13.4% of the non-agricultural labor force was unionized. By 1945, 35.8%
of the non-agricultural labor force had become unionized. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical
Abstracts of the United States 229 (2d ed. 1961),
3$ 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. II, 1972). In addition, 20 of the 50 states have enacted
legislation prohibiting discharge because of race, creed, color, or national origin. For a
discussion of state legislation dealing with discriminatory employment practices, see Note,
The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Legisla-
tion, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526 (1961).
39 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1970).
4° IS U.S.C. § 1674 (1970).
41 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970).
42 50 U.S.C.
	 459(c) (1970).
" 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970).
44
 Pattermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal, App. 2d 184, 189, 344 P.2d
25, 27 (1959).
45 Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 798, 13 Cal. Rptr.
769, 772 (1961).
46 Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., — Ind. —, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973).
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background, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire decided Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co. 47
The practical effect of the Beebe Rubber Co. decision is to
imply into the contract of employment at will, a condition that the
employer will not terminate the contract for reasons based on bad
faith, malice, or retaliation. Breach of this implied condition consti-
tutes a breach of the employment contract. The New Hampshire
court suggests that in any action maintained for such a breach, the
employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that
employee was hired by the employer under a contract of employ-
ment at will; (2) that the contract was terminated by the employer;
and (3) that the termination was motivated by bad faith, malice, or
retaliation."
The standard established by the court is one of good faith."
The standard of good faith is very different from the standard of
good cause. Under a good cause standard, the central issue is
justification for the discharge. The employee need only prove an
involuntary termination of the employment contract and the burden
immediately shifts to the employer to prove that he had reasonable
grounds for the termination. If the jury concludes that the asserted
justification is not reasonable grounds for terminating the employ-
ment contract, the employer is liable to the employee for breach of
contract."
Under the Beebe Rubber standard of good faith, in contrast to
the good cause standard, the employee must prove both the involun-
tary termination and that the termination was motivated by bad
faith in order to establish his prima facie case. Once this prima facie
case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to negate the
charge that he was motivated by bad faith. The employer need not
justify his actions by showing that he had reasonable grounds for
the termination, although such evidence would tend to show that he
was not motivated by bad faith. Thus, the employer's grounds for
terminating the employment contract may be entirely unreasonable,
but if he did not act in bad faith there is no liability to the
employee. 51
47 - N.H. —, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
44 316 A.2d at 551.
49 On the surface, there would seem to be a difference between a standard of good faith
and a standard which prohibits bad faith. However, in application, both standards raise the
question of whether the employer acted in bad faith, and under both standards the burden is
on the employee to prove such bad faith. See note 51 infra.
5° See, e.g., Carpenter Steel Co. v. Norcross, 204 F. 537, 540 (6th Cir. 1913). Davies v.
Mansbach, 338 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Ky. 1960); Heyne v. Tompkins, 89 Minn. 77, 79, 93 N.W.
901, 903 (1903); Hosking v. Hollaender Mfg. Co., 120 Ohio App. 140, 142, 175 N.E. 2d 201,
203 (1961); Tollefson v. Green Bay Packers, Inc., 256 Wis. 318, 320, 41 N.W.2d 201, 203-04
(1950).
31 The standard of good faith has long been applied to satisfaction employment con-
tracts, that is, contracts in which continued employment is conditioned on the employer's
237
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The court allowed damages equal to the plaintiff's average
weekly salary multiplied by the number of weeks between the date
of the discharge and the date that the suit was commenced. 52
However, the court did not allow damages for mental suffering,
although the possibility was not ruled out for future cases. Although
it noted the common law rule that damages for mental suffering are
not generally awarded in an action for breach of contract," the court
based its denial of such damages in this case on the fact that the
plaintiff had failed to sufficiently prove any mental suffering as a
result of the breach. 54
 If the plaintiff had been able to prove mental
suffering resulting from the breach, an award of such damages may
have been appropriate under the common law rule that such dam-
ages may be awarded in an action for breach of contract where the
breach is accompanied by wilful, wanton or insulting conduct. 55
This common law requirement of wilful, wanton or insulting con-
duct will be satisfied in most cases by the showing of bad faith,
malice • or retaliatory conduct which the employee must prove as an
element of the cause of action under the decision of the New
Hampshire court." Thus, future cases maintained under the Beebe
Rubber Co. standard may present the type of breach of contract
action for which an award of damages for mental suffering would be
appropriate.
The impact of the jury in such actions for breach of an em-
ployment contract should also be noted. Arguably, most juries will
tend to find for the employee wherever possible. In the instant case,
the employer offered direct evidence that the employee was dis-
charged for being absent from work for three consecutive days
without calling in. The employee, apparently lacking any direct
evidence as to the cause of the discharge, pointed to hostile actions
by the company foreman which took place prior to the discharge
continued satisfaction with the performance of the employee. However, his dissatisfaction
must be asserted in good faith and may not be used to cover up another reason for the
discharge. The employee has the burden of showing bad faith. See, e.g., Shephard v. Union
Cent. Life Ins. Co., 74 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1934); Rife v. Mote, 210 Ark. 626, 628, 197
S.W.2d 277, 280 (1946); MacKenzie v. Minis, 132 Ga. 323, 325, 63 S.E. 900, 903 (1909);
Ferris v. Polansky, 191 Md. 731, 733, 59 A.2d 749, 752 (1948); Kramer v. Philadelphia
Leather Goods Corp., 364 Pa. 532, 73 A.2d 385, 386 (1950).
52
 316 A.2d at 552. Therefore, if plaintiff had waited longer before commencing her suit,
she would have recovered a greater amount of lost wages. However, at common law damages
for breach of an employment contract are reduced by the amount that plaintiff earned or
could have earned through alternative employment. United Protective Workers of America v.
Ford Motor Co., 223 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1955); Carter v. Bartek, 142 Conn. 448, 449, 114
A.2d 923, 924 (1955); Sullivan v. David City Bank, 181 Neb. 395, 397, 148 N.W.2d 844, 846
(1967).
See, e.g., Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App. 483, 484, 152 N.W.2d 49, 50 (1967).
34 316 A.2d at 552.
55 Parmelee v. Ackerman, 252 F.2d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 1958); McCreery v. Miller's
Grocerteria, 99 Cob. 499, 503, 64 P.2d 803, 805 (1936); Emerman v. Baldwin, 186 Pa. Super.
561, 572, 142 A.2d 440, 477 (1958).
36 316 A.2d at 551.
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and the jury accepted the inference that this hostility ultimately
caused the discharge." As long as the employee can show hostility
by the employer prior to the discharge, many juries may be willing
to accept the inference that the hostility caused the discharge.
In summary, the New Hampshire court has created a contrac-
tual remedy for an employee whose discharge under a contract of
employment at will stems from the bad faith, malice, or retaliatory
conduct of the employer. The discharged employee is entitled to lost
wages and in many cases may also be entitled to damages for mental
suffering upon proving that mental suffering resulted from the
breach of contract. Direct evidence as to the motivations of the
employer may not be necessary in most cases.
The final question is whether the New Hampshire decision
represents a sound advancement of the law governing employment
relationships. It is undisputed that the employer has a vital interest
in running his own business as he sees fit. 58 This interest cannot be,
nor has it been, ignored by the courts. 59 However, the employee
also has a vital interest in the employment relationship which should
be recognized by the court—the interest in maintaining his
employment." Substantial retirement benefits, incurred indebted-
ness, and family responsibilities are all largely dependent on con-
tinued employment. 61 In addition, discharge from one job may
impair the employee's ability to secure another job, not only because
of the stigma attached to involuntary discharge from prior employ-
ment but also because of the decreasing job mobility in this country
over the last 50 years. 62 Finally, the psychological importance to the
employee of job security cannot be underestimated. 63 At the heart of
the New Hampshire decision is the question of whether these in-
terests of the employee should also be recognized by the courts in the
employment at will relationship.
The standard of good faith established by the court does not
impose an unreasonable burden on the interest of the employer in
running his business as he believes is best. The standard prohibits
only bad faith or abuse by the employer of his power to terminate
the employment relationship." With such fundamental interests of
the employee dependent on the conduct of the employer, it is not
unreasonable to prohibit the employer from acting in bad faith. Nor
7 316 A.2d at 550-51. The court stated: "The jury could draw the not so subtle inference
from the evidence before it that the hostility of the defendent's foreman and connivance of the
personnel manager resulted in the . . . discharge." Id. at 552.
Si
 Id. at 551.
" E.g., Coppage, 236 U.S. at 19 (1915).
6°
 316 A.2d at 551. See also, Comment, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 624, 625 (1960).
61 See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev, 335, 361 (1974).
62 Id. at 338; C. Brainerd, M. Herman, G. Palmer, H. Parnes & R. Wilcock, The
Reluctant Job Changer: Studies in Work Attachments and Aspirations 153-57 (1962).
63 Note, supra note 61, at 339.
64 316 A.2d at 551.
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does the standard of good faith expose the employer to frivolous law
suits whenever an employee is discharged. If the court had adopted
a standard of good cause, the employee would only have to allege
and prove an involuntary termination of the employment contract
and the burden would immediately shift to the employer to justify
the termination. The employer's failuke to meet this burden would
result in victory for the employee. Such a standard would certainly
create a greater possibility of frivolous law suits. However, under
the standard of good faith adopted by the court, the burden is on the
employee to prove not only involuntary termination but also bad
faith motivation. Faced with an inability to meet such a burden, it
is likely that most employees will be deterred from maintaining
frivolous suits against the employer. In addition, such frivolous suits
could be disposed of without difficulty by a motion to dismiss.
Historically, the employment at will relationship has been heav-
ily one sided; accommodating only the interests of the employer
although the employee also has important interests at stake in the
relationship. Accordingly, the New Hampshire decision in Beebe
Rubber must be applauded as an attempt to accommodate the
interests of both the employer and the employee in the employment
at will relationship, without unduly burdening or seriously jeopar-
dizing the traditional interests of the employer in running his busi-
ness as he believes is best. It is strongly urged that the courts of
other states follow the New Hampshire decision and incorporate this
development into the common law. 65
ALAN S. POLACKWICH
Administrative Law—Freedom of Information Act—Personal In-
formation Exempted from Disclosure—Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v.
IRS. '—Wine Hobby USA, Inc. (Wine Hobby), a Pennsylvania cor-
poration engaged in the sale and distribution of winemaking equip-
ment, sought from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (the Bureau) a list containing the names and addresses
of all persons in the Bureau's Mid-Atlantic Region who had regis-
tered with the Bureau to produce wine for family consumntion. 2
" No other jurisdiction has been squarely presented with the same issue as was pre-
sented in this case. However, in the case of Geary v. United States Steel Corp., — Pa. —, 319
A.2d 174 (1974), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to allow a cause of action in tort
where a salesman, employed at will, was discharged for questioning the safeness of a product
about to be marketed by his employer. 319 A.2d at 178. Citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
Justice Roberts stated in a dissenting opinion: "This court should, in my view, fulfill its societal
role and its responsibility to the public interest by recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where the dismissal offends public policy." Id. at 185 (dissenting opinion).
1
 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
2
 Id. at 134. All persons who produce wine are subject to certain tax, bonding and
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